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In local newspapers, university publications, private
websites, and even on airplane banners, advertisements
seeking egg donors abound, each advertisement offering
higher compensation than the next.' In exchange for
giving the "gift of life," egg donors can receive upwards
of $50,000.2 Egg donors to In Vitro Fertilization (IVF)
clinics may be compensated handsomely without having
their altruism questioned. In contrast, women seeking
to donate their eggs to stem cell research centers are
prohibited from receiving compensation in a few states.
Currently, California, Connecticut, and Massachusetts
have laws prohibiting compensation beyond direct
expenses for women donating their eggs to stem cell
research facilities, while not even placing a ceiling on
how much IVF clinics can compensate egg donors. 3
The stated purpose of these statutes, banning
compensation for women seeking to donate eggs to stem
cell research, is to protect women from being coerced
into undergoing a painful, medically unnecessary
procedure.' Accordingly, women can be reimbursed for
medical, travel, and miscellaneous expenses, but cannot
receive compensation beyond those expenses when
donating to stem cell research facilities. This dichotomy
in compensation is motivated by the rationale that
paying women to donate their eggs to stem cell research
facilities is coercive while paying women for donating
eggs to IVF clinics is apparently not. This article argues
that the opposite is true. Given the "repronormativity of
motherhood"'5 that exists in our society, if women who
donate to IVF clinics are considered altruistic, what
prevents healthy, young women from being pressured
into donating their eggs to help an infertile friend or
family member conceive?
What motivates the assumption that when a woman
donates to an IVF clinic and gets compensated beyond
the expenses she incurred, she acted out of altruism, yet
if a woman undergoes that same medical procedure6
in order to donate to a stem cell research facility, her
donation is deemed the product of coercion or ignorance?
Alternatively, is this differential compensation scheme a
reflection of the social value placed upon IVF versus
stem cell research? The dichotomy in compensation
seems to presuppose that egg donors, and society as a
whole, should or in fact do believe that the utility of
IVF clinics is far greater than that of stem cell research.
Accordingly, this article posits that while a woman's right
to receive compensation for the time and inconvenience
of egg donation might not be a constitutionally protected
privacy right, this differential compensation scheme is
nevertheless void under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Section II of this article discusses the framework of
these various state statutes. Section III examines the
social utility of stem cell research, focusing first on the
potential benefits that stem cell research could provide
for people suffering from genetic diseases ranging
from juvenile diabetes to Parkinson's disease. This
article also examines the potential financial benefits
of attracting private companies to invest in stem cell
research and discuss the fact that everyone involved
in stem cell research, with the exception of egg donors
themselves, are compensated for their time. Finally, this
article contends that in light of the expected social and
financial benefits associated with embryonic stem cell
research, 7 egg donors should be compensated for their
donations. Since the current ban on federal funding for
any stem cell research facility using embryos leftover
from IVF treatments limits the availability of embryos
available, and given the importance of egg donations for
stem cell research, there is no reason that women should
not be compensated for their time.'
Section IV focuses on the potential drawbacks of IVF
of which egg donors, patients, and the public at large
may be unaware. This Section analyzes the eugenic
underpinnings of IVF clinics since fertility clinics can
cherry-pick patients according to criteria such as sexual
orientation, marital status, race, and ethnicity, and then
use pretext for such discrimination in order to avoid
liability.9 Moreover, through mechanisms such as pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and sex-selection,
patients themselves can select character traits of their
children-to-be. Section V discusses the actual process
involved in donating eggs and the short and long-term
side effects of the procedure. Section VI uses a feminist
lens to critique this differential compensation scheme,
discussing the "repronormativity ofmotherhood" and the
value and definition of motherhood. Lastly, this article
examines whether these statutes violate a woman's right
to privacy and whether the statutes violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
California allows egg donors to be reimbursed for direct expenses if
women are donating for stem cell research purposes, but does not prohibit
compensation for egg donors seeking to donate their eggs to IVF clinics, or
even for sperm donors seeking to donate to stem cell research.'0 In addition,
Proposition 71 provides $3 billion in funding for stem cell research and
creates a state agency, California Institute for Regenerative Medicine
(CIRM).11 Looking at the legislative intent of this statute reveals that state
legislators hope to promote embryonic stem cell research while promoting
women's health and ensuring that women are not coerced into donating
their eggs for stem cell research purposes. The California statute does not
provide criminal sanctions for either institutions or individuals engaging in
the selling or purchasing of human eggs.
Though Connecticut also prohibits payment to egg donors seeking to
donate for stem cell research, unlike California, they similarly prohibit
compensation for sperm donors when donating to stem cell research
facilities.' 2 Moreover, Connecticut has authorized $10 million in funding
each year from 2006 to 2015 for grants-in-aid to eligible institutions
conducting embryonic or human adult stem cell research.13
Massachusetts, like California, includes a preamble explaining its intent
to promote regenerative medicine and acknowledging the considerable
chance regenerative medicine has of yielding advancements in biological
knowledge that could lead to therapies to relieve disease and injury.' 4 The
statute explicitly states that no such compensation prohibition applies to
donors seeking to donate to IVF clinics, and that the legislature does not
intend to regulate IVF clinics.'5 Moreover, it carries criminal sanctions that
provide for imprisonment for no less than one year, and no more than two
years in jail, or imprisonment in state prison for no more than five years, or
a fine of not more than $100,000.16
IIL Potenti B eanefits of Soaic Cef,\
Nucea Trnse Reseairch
Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer (SCNT) is a form of embryonic stem
cell research that requires a ready supply of human eggs.'7 In order to
understand the implications of these state prohibitions on compensation for
egg donation, it is necessary to first explain the potential medical benefits
of SCNT. Second, this article will explicate the reason that ova are required
in order for SCNT to realize these potential benefits. Third, this article
will discuss the anticipated financial gains of SCNT research, examining
the disparities of a no-compensation rule for egg donors while virtually all
other research participants are compensated for their time.
SCNT has great potential to cure genetic and neurodegenerative diseases.
Unlike adult stem cells and other cell types, human embryonic stem cells
can develop into any type of cell in the human body.'8 In fact, human
embryonic stem cells can multiply without differentiating' 9 for a significant
period of time, allowing scientists to investigate the process by which
human beings develop into healthy adults. Because of this special ability
to postpone differentiation, human embryonic stem cells provide scientists
a unique opportunity to discover the causes of many diseases, including
heart disease, juvenile diabetes, Lou Gehrig's Disease, Parkinson's disease,
and Alzheimer's disease, to name a few.20 In addition to finding the causes
for many of these diseases, embryonic stem cells could potentially provide
their cure. According to the preamble of the Maryland Stem Cell Research
Act of 2006, an estimated 128 million Americans currently suffer from these
chronic, degenerative diseases. 2' Unlike other types of stem cell research,
SCNT allows scientists to target specific diseases to increase knowledge of
genetic diseases, develop new treatments, create cell-based therapies, and
grow immuno-compatible transplant tissues.
In SCNT, two cells are combined in order to grow one cell with particular
genetic characteristics. Scientists remove the nuclear DNA from an oocyte,
leaving an "ovaplast."2 2 Scientists then extract the nucleus of a specialized
somatic cell and insert it into the ovaplast, creating a genetically reconstructed
ovum. Instead of creating an embryo, this ovum is programmed to create
somatic cells. Once scientists stimulate this ovum, it begins dividing cells,
forming a blastocyst. 23 In contrast to blastocysts formed when a sperm
fertilizes an egg, a blastocyst created by SCNT is genetically identical to the
somatic cell from which nuclear DNA was extracted earlier in the process.
Once the ovum has developed into a blastocyst, scientists then interrupt
further development in order to use the blastocyst for research. 2 4
Because ova are pluripotent, 25 largely capable of self-renewal, and can
proliferate extensively, there are currently no adequate substitutes for
human egg use in SCNT. While scientists have proposed using eggs from
other animals, eggs created by the manipulation of stem cell lines, or using
eggs derived from fetal cadavers, each of these alternatives present their
own problems. First, eggs from other species would cause an interspecies
mixture of DNA which scientists have been unable to resolve.26 Second,
creating human eggs by manipulating human stem cell lines is not yet
scientifically feasible. 27 Third, because abortion would constitute at least
one source of fetal cadavers, this procedure would likely cause more
controversy than the use of human eggs.28 Since no feasible alternative to
human egg donation exists, these compensation prohibitions will greatly
impede the progress of SCNT and the promise of treating and curing
numerous genetic diseases.
While indicating that the benefits of embryonic stem cell research are
"uncertain," thus justifying a no compensation rule for egg donations
made to stem cell research centers, both California and Connecticut have
pledged significant state funding for stem cell research. In 2004, California
committed to donating an astounding $3 billion in state funding for
embryonic stem cell research. 29 Connecticut has promised to donate $10
million a year from 2006 until 2015, a total contribution of $ 1 billion.30 The
fact that Connecticut and California have contributed such a considerable
sum belies the rhetoric that egg donors should not be compensated because
they would be coerced into donating in exchange for uncertain returns.
In addition to expected improvements in regenerative
medicine, states also anticipate receiving a share of the
prospective profits of embryonic stem cell research.
For example, in California, besides authorizing $3
billion in funding, Proposition 71 created the CIRM to,
among other things, "make grants and loans for stem
cell research, for research facilities, and for other vital
research opportunities to realize therapies, protocols,
and medical procedures that will result in the cure for,
or substantial mitigation of, diseases and injuries." 31
Non-profit institutions receiving CIRM funds own any
resulting patents.32 However, for revenue over $500,000
generated from any ensuing patents, California can claim
a share of the profits. 33 Moreover, states are interested
in placing as few restrictions on stem cell research as
possible to attract biotechnology companies to create
new jobs and help stagnant economies.34
Virtually the only participants that would not have
a financial interest in stem cell research would be the
egg donors themselves. Besides state governments,
researchers, universities, biotechnology companies,
the pharmaceutical industry, lawyers, and health care
providers all stand to profit from stem cell research and
regenerative medicine. 35 "Only the providers of the
necessary tissues, without which the research cannot be
done and new medical treatments cannot be developed,
who are singled out for remuneration prohibitions."36
No vocal opposition seems to exist in regard to anyone
else being compensated for their time.
Because approximately 12 percent of all IVF procedures
performed in the United States use donated eggs, 3 7 it
is important to examine the problems inherent in IVF
clinic procedures. Although the rhetoric behind in
vitro fertilization clinics is that egg donors are helping
infertile women create loving and caring families,
donors may not know who is actually benefiting from
in vitro fertilization. In a survey conducted by Fertility
and Sterility, 122 prospective egg donors were given
various scenarios. Some of these scenarios include
having a donor's eggs be given to recipients of different
ethnic backgrounds, recipients who are HIV positive,
and women over 50.38 Once informed of the various
possible destinations of donated eggs, a significant
number of prospective donors were ambivalent.3 9
Furthermore, six percent of those surveyed were
unwilling to proceed altogether.4 0 This section explores
the eugenic undertones of IVF clinics, both at the hands
of clinics themselves, and at the behest of patients.
Presently, only seven states mandate that health
insurance companies cover IVF treatments.4 1 At the
average cost of $12,400 per cycle of IVF, and at an
average total cost of $100,000,42 only wealthy, middle
class women can afford to undergo IVF treatment.4 3
In addition to being prohibitively expensive, fertility
clinics are also selective as to whom they sign up as
patients based on a variety of criteria that runs the
gambit from age and marital status to sexual orientation.
For example, when Guadalupe Benitez and her partner
Joanne Clark attempted to obtain in utero insemination 4 4
from North Coast Women's Care, located in California,
they were rejected because they were lesbians and the
director of the clinic thought it morally reprehensible
to help lesbians beget children.45 Ms. Benitez sued the
clinic claiming discrimination on the basis of her sexual
orientation and won at trial. However, on appeal, the
clinic successfully argued that it refused to treat Ms.
Benitez on the basis of her marital status, not on the
basis of her sexual orientation. 46 Although the clinic was
motivated by the fact that Ms. Benitez was a lesbian, it
was nevertheless able to avoid liability by providing an
alternate justification for refusing to treat her.47
In an interview with Dr. Geoffrey Sher, the founder and
medical director of the biggest chain of fertility clinics in
the world, the Sher Institute of Reproductive Medicine,
Dr. Sher was asked the following questions:
"How much selecting is going on?"
"A lot."
"How much is a lot?"
"A lot." 48
During this interview, Dr. Sher admitted that a great deal
of screening and selection takes place behind closed
doors. A study conducted by Fertility and Sterility
showed similar findings.49 When asked about a doctor's
prerogative to decide who is a fit parent, 56 percent
polled responded that they thought doctors had a right to
determine who is fit for parenthood.o Moreover, when
asked whom specifically doctors would object to having
as patients:
Forty-eight percent of responding directors said
they were very or extremely likely to turn away a
gay couple seeking a seeking a surrogate, 38 percent
said they would turn away a couple on welfare who
wanted to pay for ART [Assisted Reproductive
Technology] with Social Security checks, 20 percent
said they would turn away a single woman, 17 percent
would turn away a lesbian couple. . .. 5 percent said
they would turn away a biracial couple."'
Both the interview with Dr. Sher and the results of this
survey demonstrate the prevalence of impermissible
discrimination. So long as fertility clinics can provide
legitimate reasons for their illegitimate preferences,
these organizations can continue to discriminate against
prospective patients freely. 52
B, E ,.ugeni cs -Ba,:ts ed IPra -cic e s of Patient
Selection of character traits of future offspring by
patients receiving IVF treatment allows patients to
practice "positive eugenics" in addition to the "negative
eugenics"53 practiced by some IVF clinics. Because
the IVF industry is not federally regulated 54 and due
to the dearth of statutory and case law regulating egg
donation,55 clinics can honor requests by patients to
create offspring with specific character traits which can
be accomplished by selecting egg donors with a specific
eye color, hair color, height, IQ, etcetera. Egg donors
can either be recruited directly by the patients, through
independent fertility clinics, or by private egg brokerage
firms catering to medical centers associated with fertility
centers.56 In California and New York, egg brokerage
firms have flourished in order to meet the demand for
"'desirable' donors."57
To illustrate this point further, the profile of a typical
woman using IVF is a white, upper-middle class woman
in her late 30's who is college-educated.58 The typical
profile of an egg-donor at one of the nation's leading
fertility clinics is that of a young, white woman with
some college education. 59 This is no coincidence. If
women are unable to conceive their own biological
children, they at least want to have children who
resemble them and have similar phenotypes. However,
nothing prevents these women from taking it a step
further and attempting to create super babies.
In in vitro fertilization, three different procedures for
sex selection are available in which the sex can be
selected or determined before fertilizing the egg, once
an embryo is formed, and once the embryo has been
successfully implanted in utero and has developed into
a fetus. 60 Spinning sperm in a centrifuge can separate
Y-bearing sperm from X-bearing sperm, allowing
patients to choose which sperm to use in fertilizing the
egg. 6' Moreover, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis
(PGD) allows doctors to test an embryo's chromosomes
for sex. Finally, selective reduction allows a woman to
terminate a fetus or fetuses on the basis of sex.62
Why do patients choose to engage in sex-selection?
their same sex.63 Some families want to strike a balance
between the number of boys and girls they have.64 Still,
others are motivated by cultural perceptions of gender.
Dr. Mark Evans, an obstetrician-geneticist shares, "[f]
or years ... the majority of sex-selection requests came
from Asian and Indian parents, who tended to want to
keep the boys."65 Though Dr. Evans refuses to honor
such requests motivated by clear gender bias, he will
nevertheless honor requests for gay and lesbian couples
seeking to have boys and girls, respectively.66
Still, other clinics will honor all requests for sex-
selection and even go so far as to advertise sex-selection
services in upscale magazines.6 7 Sex-selection, when
used in order to prevent passing on genetic anomalies
to offspring, may not seem like a troubling use of sex-
Some patients have genetic diseases which are only
transmitted to a specific sex. Others are lesbian or gay
couples who believe it would be easier to raise children of
selection, but this too raises serious concerns about
creating "designer babies."
Clearly, in some places around the globe, the preference
for male children is so strong that the use of ultrasound
and other technologies for sex-selection has strongly
skewed the usual ratio of boys to girls. It is not
uncommon for American and European specialists
in fertility and reproductive technology to point with
horror at the declining numbers of girls in China and
India. We, the Westerners claim in righteous tones, use
the technology for good, medical reasons; they use it for
bad, social reasons.
Activists and others concerned about disability rights are
less clear about the difference. Do Western parents who
are given the option already decide not to have children
who would be mildly retarded, need a wheelchair, or be
blind? Like being a girl in a culture that values boys, is
being disabled a handicap that is best overcome through
changes in society?6 8
Choosing to create or implant an embryo or terminate
a fetus solely on the basis of sex in order to avoid
creating offspring with genetic anomalies or due to
gender perceptions or gender bias raises concerns about
creating "desirable" children.
Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis allows patients
receiving IVF treatments to test chromosomes of
embryos for potential genetic defects. PGD involves
extracting a single cell from the embryo and performing
laboratory tests on the nuclear DNA for any genetic
anomalies. Despite the risk that PGD might damage the
embryos when a cell is extracted, patients nevertheless
elect to run these tests to avoid transferring embryos
with genetic defects.69 Through the use of PGD, doctors
can now detect the following afflictions: "hemophilia;
fragile X syndrome; neuromuscular dystrophy; cystic
fibrosis; Tays-Sachs; Down syndrome, and hundreds
of other genetic disorders, some of them fatal, some
of them fatal after months, even years, of suffering." 70
In addition, PGD can also detect embryos carrying
diseases that are not apparent until adulthood, such as a
predisposition to breast cancer or Alzheimer's disease.'
While prevention of human suffering is an honorable
function of PGD, when a genetic anomaly does not
cause suffering or fatality, but instead causes dwarfism,
for example, PGD could be used as a tool to create a
superior breed where differences are marginalized.
Although there is currently no technique which enables
Gregory Pence demonstrates the potentially disastrous
consequences of allowing market forces, unregulated by
government, to create designer babies:
Some day soon, when the opportunities arise, we
will see the wisdom of allowing parents maximal
choice about their future children. This is not state-
controlled eugenics (which attempted to take away
such choices from parents) but its opposite. If a
child can be given an extra decade of life by an
artificial chromosome, or 50 percent more memory
through a therapy in utero, then I personally
would feel obligated to give my future child such
benefits.
What I fail to understand is how other people-
or the federal government-could think it just
to prevent a parent from benefiting her future
children in this way-for example by banning such
enhancements. I see no difference between such
a ban and a similar ban on parents sending their
children to computer camps in the summer: both
are intended to better children, both will be done
most by people with money.72
Leaving aside the ethical implications of genetic
enhancement, the difference between banning genetic
enhancement of embryos and sending children to
computer camp has its roots in the history of eugenics in
this country. If the only people who have this "choice"
are upper-middle class families, then the privilege
of being a white child would take on a whole new
meaning, while births of non-white children would be
further marginalized.
'N.Procedure Involved lin, , Eggk,
N\_11ation1
Women donating eggs to both stem cell research
facilities and to IVF clinics must first undergo a
screening process in which donors are medically and
psychologically evaluated. 73 Donors are then subjected
to hormone injections for seven to ten days in order to
stimulate the ovaries. These hormones typically cause
stimulation of five to 15 eggs.74 The progress of donors
in both scenarios is monitored by ultrasound. 5 Once
the eggs have matured, donors receive an injection of
human chronic gonadotropin (HCG). Subsequently,
these matured eggs are removed during an out-patient
procedure in which donors are given anesthesia.
Doctors remove the eggs by inserting a needle through
the v agina and into the ov aries, w~here eggs are suctioned
in the needle and deposited into test tubes.76
parents to genetically enhance an embryo, advancements
in PGD technology could have profound implications for
the future. The following quotation from Philosopher
Short-term side effects of egg donation can include mood swings, headache,
bloating, nausea, fatigue, breast tenderness, problems sleeping, body aches,
problems with vision, and compulsory abstinence.77 Long-term side effects
of egg donation include, among others, the risk of decreased fertility in
the future, ovarian cancer, and ovarian hyperstimulation." Women who
receive the highest doses of fertility drugs in order to donate eggs are only
now reaching an age where cancer becomes more common. 79 Therefore,
studies have not found any conclusive evidence regarding the risks of
ovarian cancer or decreased fertility.so
133 Diffe renciesi rcdr ewenEgDnto oI VF
VOYS\u~s SenCell Resear ch
Unlike egg donors to stem cell research facilities, egg donors for IVF
are usually phenotypically matched to recipients so that the donor has a
"similar look and background as the female recipient of the oocyte." 8" An
additional step involved in the egg donation process that is peculiar to
the IVF context is that a donor's menstrual cycle must be matched with
the recipient's cycle. 82 Accordingly, egg donors to IVF must receive an
additional ten days of hormone injections with concentrated drugs such as
Lupron in order to suppress the function of the donors' ovaries.83 Women
donating their eggs to IVF then must go a more arduous and dangerous
procedure than women donating their eggs to stem cell research centers.
VI. .. h.eC ecinof th.-\e Repon rm tiit
ofMoth\.,,erhood and the Con stiftuit ional
S a -fe.g ua -rd s o f ChoI c e andii E Jq uai Prowt e ctv-in
Given the drawbacks ofIVF and the potential benefits of stem cell research
discussed above, and given that the risks involved in egg donation exceeds
the risks inherent in donations to stem cell research, the policy rationale
behind this differential compensation scheme seems questionable at best.
This section examines the underlying presumptions that prompt the no
compensation rule. The first presumption is that payment can constitute a
form of coercion in and of itself. The second presumption is that women
are defined by their fertility and, therefore, donating eggs to an IVF clinic is
inherently altruistic, regardless of how sizeable the compensation received.
This analysis also evaluates whether these statutes violate a woman's
fundamental right to choose, and concludes that these statutes are likely
unconstitutional pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Black's Law Dictionary defines coercion as "[cjonduct that constitutes
the improper use of economic powver to compel another to submit to the
wishes of one who wields it.'8 The position of state legislators is that
paying women to donate their eggs to stem cell research facilities would
be coercive. However, the very compensation schemes California,
Connecticut, and Maryland have created coerce women to donate to IVF
clinics. Since compensation to women donating eggs to IVF clinics is
unregulated, women who otherwise wish to donate to stem cell research
centers might be coerced into donating for IVF clinics simply for the
financial gain. According to Dr. Mark V. Sauer, the director of the assisted
reproduction program at Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center, his list
of prospective egg donors has recently doubled to over 500.85 Dr. Sauer
and other fertility doctors believe the surge in interest is correlated with a
recent jump in the amount paid for the services of egg donors.86 If the aim
of state legislators is to decrease coercion in egg donations to stem cell
research, then legislators should provide that egg donors to IVF and stem
cell research be compensated similarly. Furthermore, to allay concerns of
undue influence resulting from exorbitant compensation, legislators could
place a ceiling on the amount that egg donors may receive for their time
and inconvenience.
B 4 The Reprononurivit ofwMoterhood
In addition to the coercive compensation scheme which favors egg
donation to IVF, the repronormativity of motherhood also places pressure
on women to donate eggs to IVF centers. By stating that the benefits of
embryonic stem cell research are uncertain, whereas the benefits of IVF
are clear (helping an infertile woman be able to conceive), state legislators
reinforce the notion that a woman's worth is at least partially connected
to her fertility." For example, conceiving biological offspring8 9 is seen
as a social good whereas adoption is only considered as a last resort.
"Reproduction has been so taken for granted that only women who are not
parents are regarded as having made a choice-a choice that is construed
as nontraditional, nonconventional, and for some, non-natural."9 0 Because
motherhood is considered "society-preserving," altruistic work, to refuse it
seems a selfish lifestyle choice. Motherhood is so sacrosanct in our society
that legislators seem afraid to regulate in this area, afraid to question the
health risks associated with egg donation in IVF, and afraid to consider
whether the exorbitant compensation to egg donors in the IVF context is
coercive.
Having established that payment for egg donations to stem cell research
is not coercive per se, the question remains whether these differential
compensation schemes violate a woman's constitutional right to privacy, or
right to choice. Roe v. Wade is primarily associated with the holding that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a constitutional
right to privacy.9' More importantly, however, Roe held that fetuses and
earlier stages of development up to fertilized eggs are not "persons" within
the meaning of the Constitution.9 2 Additionally, it held that the state has
an important and legitimate interest in protecting potential human life.93
Because the state has a recognized interest in the development of potential
human life, the Supreme Court balanced a woman's right to privacy against
a state's interests in the potential for life. During the first trimester, a
woman's constitutional right to liberty and privacy are the strongest, and a
state's interests are at their weakest.
In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court confirmed a prior Court holding "that our
laws and tradition afford constitutional protection to personal decisions
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships,
child rearing and education."9 4 In this context, privacy rights are primarily
understood as respecting a person's autonomy in their sexual lives.
Similarly, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court referred to one's privacy rights
as essential to protect single and married individuals from unwarranted
government intrusion into one's decision whether or not to "bear or beget
a child."95
Framed in this manner, the question then becomes
whether the doctrine of privacy will apply in the context
of new reproductive and scientific technologies, much
the same way that courts have asked whether the First
Amendment applies to the Internet. 96 The strongest
argument in favor of applying the right to privacy in
the context of embryonic stem cell research is that by
donating eggs to stem cell research facilities, women
are contributing to researchers' understanding of the
replication of human cells. The very goal of SCNT is to
develop therapeutic cloning in the future. Therapeutic
cloning involves replicating fragments of an individual's
DNA in order to replace diseased cells. Since cloning
is a form of asexual reproduction similar to the process
involved in reproduction of offspring, interpreting an
egg donor's right to privacy depends upon the Court's
rationale for recognizing a right to privacy from
unwarranted government intrusion into the decision
to have offspring. Like the decision to have genetic
offspring, the decision whether or not to donate one's
eggs for any reason (whether motivated by compensation,
furthering therapeutic cloning, or a combination of both)
involves an individual's conception of the meaning
of life. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should find a
woman's fundamental right to privacy encompasses her
right to donate her eggs freely, whether in the context of
stem cell research or in vitro fertilization.
DI Eqkual Prote4, , Cti o\"\n
If the Court finds that a fundamental right to privacy
applies to a woman's decision to donate her eggs, these
state regulations would be unconstitutional unless the
state can demonstrate a compelling state interest.97
Although these states might argue that they have a
compelling state interest in regulating egg donations in
order to preserve potential life, this argument is flawed
for several reasons. The predominant view is that at the
earliest, human life begins at conception. Therefore,
the state has an interest in protecting an embryo as a
potential person. However, in SCNT, no embryos are
created. Although SCNT is considered a subcategory
of embryonic stem cell research, this is a misnomer
because the eggs are not fertilized by sperm. Moreover,
if one believes that conception occurs in the womb,
then embry os created outside the w~omb may not be
considered potential human beings. States eager to
promote embryonic stem cell research would have no
incentive to pass legislation that defines conception in
any other manner.
Even if states defined human life as beginning with
a mature egg or before fertilization of an egg, states
would still not be furthering a compelling interest in
prohibiting compensation to egg donors of stem cell
research while leaving compensation to egg donors
of IVF clinics unregulated. The argument that states
are protecting human life is tenuous because, in the
context of IVF, excess embryos are frequently created
and are frozen or discarded. Moreover, because in
vitro fertilization is an emerging field, researchers
do not yet know how many transferred embryos are
implantable in a woman's uterus. This has led to high
order multiple pregnancies which cause complications
to both mother and child. Thus, patients often undergo
selective reduction in which one or more fetuses is
terminated. 98 If one has a fundamental right to privacy
in donating eggs, the differential compensation schemes
in California, Connecticut, and Massachusetts would be
an unconstitutional violation of that right.
Regardless of whether or not the Supreme Court finds
a privacy interest in the donation of eggs, California's
regulation is likely an unconstitutional as a means
of gender-based classification. Unlike Connecticut
and Massachusetts, California allows sperm donors
to be compensated for donations made to stem cell
research, while prohibiting egg donors from receiving
any compensation beyond direct expenses. Since
all sperm donors are males and all egg donors are
females, the differential scheme necessarily implicates
gender. Gender classifications trigger heightened
scrutiny of state regulation and will only be upheld if
the government provides "an exceedingly persuasive
justification." 99 The purpose of the statute is clear: the
process of egg donation is invasive and can cause serious
side effects, therefore the prohibition on compensation
is meant to protect women. So long as prospective
egg donors provide informed consent of the potential
health risks involved, they can decide whether the risks
of donating outweigh the benefits. By "protecting
women," this statute assumes that women cannot make
informed decisions about their own bodies, a view that
is paternalistic, patronizing, and unconstitutional.
VIL Cone chusionIH
At first glance, the rationale behind statutes that create
differential compensation schemes are concerned with
women's health. By prohibiting compensation, state
legislators reason that women will not be coerced into
donating their eggs to stem cell research. However,
if concern that compensation will coerce women were
indeed the rationale behind these statutes, legislators
would not leave compensation for egg donations to
IVF clinics up to market forces, where women can be
compensated upwards of $50,00.100 A compensation
scheme favoring egg donations to IVF clinics is even
more coercive in light of the repronormativity of
motherhood in this culture. Because motherhood is
viewed as altruistic, potential egg donors will more
likely be coerced into donating for IVF clinics because
their donation will be viewed as altruistic and they also will be compensated
generously for their time.
Depending on how the Supreme Court interprets reproductive privacy rights
involving technology and cloning, these statutes, besides being questionable
as a policy matter, potentially infringe on the constitutional right to privacy.
Because privacy rights are in a state of flux after Gonzalez v. Carhart,'ol
it is difficult to know whether the Court will apply reproductive privacy
rights in the context of reproductive and biomedical technologies such as
therapeutic cloning. Carhart involved a woman's right to privacy in the
third trimester, when a woman's interests are much weaker in comparison
to a state's interests in regulation.102  Since egg donation precedes even
the first trimester framework, Carhart does not necessarily indicate how
the Court would decide privacy rights in egg donation.103 However, new
reproductive technologies challenge the whole trimester framework in Roe
and potentially call for an entirely new approach to reproductive privacy
rights.
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